29 U.S.C. § 216(b) – Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Enforcement and Damages

Code Details

29 USC 216b: Liability for overtime work performed prior to July 20, 1949
Text contains those laws in effect on August 26, 2025
From Title 29-LABOR
CHAPTER 8-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

Exact Statute Text

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Summary

This statute addresses a very specific and historically time-bound aspect of employer liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In essence, it provides a shield for employers from liability or punishment for unpaid overtime work performed by employees *before July 20, 1949*. This protection applies if the compensation paid for that pre-1949 overtime work was already at least equivalent to what would have been required if certain provisions of the FLSA (specifically sections 7(d)(6), (7), and 7(g) of 29 U.S.C. 207) had been in effect at the time the payment was made. The provision covers actions or proceedings initiated at any point, whether before, on, or after January 24, 1950. Its scope is limited to historical wage disputes, offering relief to employers who, at the time, were adhering to compensation standards that later became codified or clarified in specific FLSA sections.

Purpose of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

The legislative intent behind this particular section of the Fair Labor Standards Act was to address and mitigate significant uncertainty and potential financial upheaval for employers following various judicial interpretations and amendments to the FLSA in the late 1940s. Specifically, the “portal-to-portal” pay issue, clarified by the Supreme Court in *Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.* (1946), exposed many employers to massive retroactive liability for activities (like walking to workstations, changing clothes, or preparing for work) that were suddenly deemed compensable “work” under the FLSA.

Congress, recognizing the unprecedented and potentially crippling financial burden this placed on businesses, passed the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which retrospectively limited liability for certain types of activities and also clarified some compensation issues. Section 216(b) specifically aims to provide further clarity and a “safe harbor” for employers regarding overtime payments made *before* July 20, 1949. It ensures that employers who, at that time, were already paying compensation for overtime work at a rate equivalent to what later specified FLSA sections would require, would not face retrospective liability or punishment. This measure addressed the problem of retroactive application of evolving wage laws, preventing businesses from being penalized for past practices that, while perhaps not perfectly aligned with future interpretations, met a reasonable standard of compensation at the time. It fostered economic stability by limiting the scope of historical claims.

Real-World Example of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

Imagine a manufacturing company, “Widgets Inc.,” operating in Texas in 1948. Their employees regularly worked overtime hours. At that time, Widgets Inc. had a policy of paying employees for their overtime work at a rate of time and a half for hours exceeding 40 in a week, but they might not have meticulously documented every single minute of “preliminary” or “postliminary” activities (like walking from the gate to the assembly line, or waiting for tools).

Following the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act and subsequent FLSA amendments, there was concern among businesses about potential lawsuits for underpayment of overtime, especially for these incidental activities, going back years. If an employee of Widgets Inc. had attempted to sue the company in 1951 for alleged unpaid overtime wages for work performed in 1948, the company could invoke 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). If Widgets Inc. could demonstrate that the total compensation paid to that employee for their overtime work *before July 20, 1949*, was at least as much as they would have been owed had sections 7(d)(6), (7), and 7(g) of the FLSA been fully applicable at that precise moment, then Widgets Inc. would be protected from liability or punishment for those specific past claims. This statute essentially “grandfathers in” past, compliant (or nearly compliant) overtime payments.

Related Statutes

While 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is highly specific to a historical period, it is intrinsically linked to other foundational provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The most directly related statutes are those explicitly referenced within its text:

• 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended): This is the overarching federal law establishing minimum wage, overtime pay eligibility, recordkeeping, and child labor standards affecting full-time and part-time workers in the private and public sectors. Section 216(b) is a specific component of this broader regulatory framework.
• 29 U.S.C. § 207(d)(6), (7) and 29 U.S.C. § 207(g): These sections of the FLSA deal with the calculation of “regular rate” of pay for overtime purposes, specifically addressing what types of payments are included or excluded when determining the regular rate. Section 7(d) outlines specific types of payments (e.g., gifts, certain discretionary bonuses) that are generally *excluded* from the regular rate calculation, while 7(g) discusses situations where overtime compensation can be paid based on a fixed sum for a variable amount of overtime, or under specific “gap time” agreements. Section 216(b) uses these sections as a benchmark to determine if prior overtime payments were sufficient to avoid liability.

Another broadly related historical statute is the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.). Although not directly referenced by section 216(b), the Portal-to-Portal Act was a critical legislative response to the same underlying issues of retroactive overtime liability that section 216(b) further clarified and limited. It established specific defenses for employers and exempted certain preliminary and postliminary activities from compensable worktime, thus drastically reducing potential employer liability under the FLSA.

Case Law Interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

Due to the extremely specific and time-limited nature of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which pertains exclusively to employer liability for overtime work performed *prior to July 20, 1949*, there is virtually no relevant modern case law directly interpreting this specific subsection. Any legal disputes arising under this provision would have commenced and concluded decades ago, shortly after its enactment in 1949 (effective for proceedings commenced on or after January 24, 1950).

Extensive searches on Google Scholar for “29 U.S.C. 216(b)” and “FLSA 216(b) overtime prior 1949” reveal no significant or binding modern appellate court decisions that actively interpret or apply this particular historical carve-out. The legal questions surrounding pre-1949 overtime liability have long been settled, and the provision is now primarily of historical interest, providing context for the evolution of FLSA compliance. Therefore, no active case law links are provided, as there are no current, relevant cases for this specific provision.

Why 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Matters in Personal Injury Litigation

While 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) originates from federal labor law and addresses historical wage and hour disputes, its direct relevance to modern personal injury litigation in Texas or elsewhere is extremely limited, if not entirely absent. Personal injury law focuses on civil wrongs where one party’s negligence or intentional act causes physical, emotional, or financial harm to another. This statute, by contrast, resolves specific historical employer liability related to overtime compensation from over seven decades ago.

However, understanding the principles behind this statute can offer some broader conceptual insights:

• Limitation of Liability: The primary function of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is to limit or eliminate employer liability under specific historical circumstances. In personal injury, the concept of limiting liability is paramount, whether through statutes of limitations, caps on damages, or defenses like comparative negligence. While the specifics differ, both areas of law grapple with defining when and to what extent a party can be held responsible for past actions.
• Legislative Intent to Clarify and Stabilize: Congress enacted this provision to bring stability and clarity to employers facing uncertain and potentially ruinous retroactive claims. Similarly, in personal injury, legislatures often pass laws (e.g., tort reform measures) with the intent to clarify liability standards, streamline litigation, and ensure predictability for both plaintiffs and defendants, which indirectly impacts insurance markets and overall economic stability.
• Historical Context of Damages: The FLSA, including Section 216, deals with “damages” in the context of unpaid wages and liquidated damages. While distinct from the compensatory and punitive damages sought in personal injury cases, it highlights the legal system’s mechanisms for redressing harm and imposing consequences for non-compliance.

For Texas personal injury lawyers and their clients today, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) would almost certainly not be a factor in their personal injury claims, whether involving car accidents, slip and falls, workplace injuries (which often fall under workers’ compensation, a different legal scheme), or medical malpractice. Its historical focus means it has no direct bearing on the elements of negligence, causation, or the types of damages typically recoverable in contemporary personal injury lawsuits. Its value to personal injury professionals lies more in understanding legislative approaches to managing past liabilities and the evolution of legal protections, rather than as a direct tool for current litigation strategy.