42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 – Title VII (Civil Rights Act): Unlawful Employment Practices (Discrimination)
Table of Contents
Code Details
42 USC 2000e-2: Unlawful employment practices
Text contains those laws in effect on August 27, 2025
From Title 42-THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Exact Statute Text
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(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) Training programs
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions with personnel of particular religion
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or Communist-front organizations
As used in this subchapter, the phrase “unlawful employment practice” shall not be deemed to include any action or measure taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who is a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organization required to register as a Communist-action or Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 [50 U.S.C. 781 et seq.].
(g) National security
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if-
(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute of the United States or any Executive order of the President; and
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.
(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized by minimum wage provisions
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to Indians
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing number or percentage imbalance
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of “alternative employment practice”.
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule barring the employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.] or any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(l) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing litigated or consent judgments or orders
(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws-
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had-
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-
(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the parties intervened;
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be represented in such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought in such action by the Federal Government;
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution.
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of title 28.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 Summary
This federal statute, often known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, establishes what constitutes an unlawful employment practice. It broadly prohibits discrimination in employment based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The law applies to various entities within the employment context, including employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations.
The statute makes it illegal for employers to make hiring, firing, compensation, or other job-related decisions based on these protected characteristics. It also prevents employment agencies from refusing to refer individuals or classifying them based on these traits, and stops labor unions from discriminating in membership or referrals. Furthermore, discrimination in apprenticeship and training programs is prohibited.
Section 2000e-2 also outlines several exceptions and specific considerations. For example, it allows discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin if it’s a “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) essential for the business. Religious educational institutions can also prioritize employees of their particular faith. Other sections address issues like seniority systems, merit systems, national security concerns, preferential treatment for Native Americans on or near reservations, and the prohibition of quotas or “preferential treatment” to correct imbalances. It also details rules for disparate impact cases, the discriminatory use of test scores, and how challenges to certain employment practices established by court orders are handled.
Purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
The legislative intent behind this section of Title VII is to promote equal employment opportunities and eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Enacted as part of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, the statute addresses historical and systemic inequalities that prevented individuals from securing or advancing in employment solely due to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. By clearly defining and prohibiting “unlawful employment practices,” Congress sought to create a fairer job market where qualifications and performance, rather than prejudice, dictate career paths. This foundational piece of civil rights legislation aims to protect individuals from adverse employment actions, such as wrongful termination, denial of promotion, or unfair compensation, that are rooted in bias. It provides a legal framework for victims of workplace discrimination to seek justice and recourse, ensuring that employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies adhere to principles of equality.
Real-World Example of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
Imagine Sarah, a highly qualified chemical engineer with 15 years of experience, applies for a senior leadership position at a large manufacturing company in Houston, Texas. She progresses through several interview rounds, consistently receiving positive feedback on her technical skills, leadership abilities, and strategic vision. However, during the final interview, the hiring manager, Mr. Thompson, makes several comments about the company’s “old-school culture” and “how much better a man would fit into the executive team’s dynamics.” Sarah also notices that the company’s executive board and senior leadership are almost exclusively male. Despite being the most qualified candidate, Sarah receives a rejection letter, while a less experienced male candidate is hired.
In this scenario, Sarah might have a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) for sex discrimination. The statute makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire… any individual… because of such individual’s… sex.” Mr. Thompson’s comments and the company’s hiring decision, despite Sarah’s superior qualifications, suggest that her sex was a motivating factor in the refusal to hire her, directly violating the protections afforded by Title VII. Sarah could file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging unlawful sex discrimination.
Related Statutes
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (Title VII – Other Unlawful Employment Practices): This section prohibits retaliation against individuals who oppose discriminatory practices or participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. It also prohibits employers from publishing discriminatory notices or advertisements.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII – Definitions): This introductory section defines key terms used throughout Title VII, such as “person,” “employer,” “employment agency,” “labor organization,” and “employee,” which are crucial for understanding the scope and applicability of § 2000e-2.
- 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Equal Pay Act of 1963): Referenced in subsection (h) of § 2000e-2, this federal law prohibits sex-based wage discrimination between men and women in the same establishment who perform jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Equal Rights Under the Law): While broader, this Reconstruction-era civil rights statute prohibits discrimination based on race or ethnicity in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment contracts. It provides an alternative or concurrent legal avenue for race discrimination claims.
- Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.): Prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in employment. While a separate law, its structure and enforcement mechanisms often overlap with Title VII, particularly in the context of workplace discrimination.
- Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.): Protects individuals who are 40 years of age or older from employment discrimination based on age. Like the ADA, it is a related federal anti-discrimination statute with similar goals.
Case Law Interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
Numerous landmark cases have interpreted and shaped the application of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. These judicial decisions provide critical guidance on how the statute is applied in practice:
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: This 1971 U.S. Supreme Court case established the “disparate impact” theory of discrimination under Title VII. It held that employment practices that appear neutral on their face, but have a disproportionately negative effect on a protected group, are unlawful if they are not related to job performance or business necessity. This case directly relates to subsection (k) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: A 1973 Supreme Court decision that set forth the burden-shifting framework for proving “disparate treatment” (intentional discrimination) in Title VII cases. This framework is crucial for plaintiffs alleging violations of subsection (a) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: This 1989 Supreme Court case introduced the “mixed-motive” theory, holding that an employment decision is unlawful if a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, even if other legitimate factors also played a role. This decision was later codified in subsection (m) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
- Bostock v. Clayton County: A significant 2020 Supreme Court ruling that held discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII, thereby expanding the protections of subsection (a) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to LGBTQ+ individuals.
Why 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 Matters in Personal Injury Litigation
While 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 primarily governs employment law, its principles can indirectly influence or intersect with personal injury litigation, particularly concerning the damages awarded for personal harm resulting from discriminatory actions. In the broader sense, employment discrimination itself inflicts “personal injury” on an individual, affecting their emotional well-being, financial stability, and professional reputation.
When an individual suffers discrimination as defined by this statute, such as wrongful termination or a hostile work environment, the resulting harm is often not just economic (lost wages, benefits) but also deeply personal. Victims frequently experience severe emotional distress, anxiety, depression, loss of self-esteem, and even physical manifestations of stress. These non-economic damages are analogous to pain and suffering or mental anguish claimed in traditional personal injury cases. A skilled personal injury attorney familiar with employment law can help clients understand the full scope of their injuries, both tangible and intangible, and advocate for comprehensive compensation.
For plaintiffs in Texas, understanding how Title VII provides a legal basis for challenging unlawful employment practices is crucial. Although direct physical injury in the workplace is typically covered by workers’ compensation or specific premises liability laws, the psychological and financial toll of discrimination can be devastating. Lawyers specializing in civil rights and employment law, often overlapping with personal injury practices due to the nature of the harm, frequently seek damages for emotional distress, medical expenses related to mental health treatment, and reputational damage alongside economic losses like back pay and front pay. This statute ensures that individuals who suffer such personal harms due to workplace discrimination have a path to justice and recovery.