33 U.S.C. § 905 – Exclusiveness of Liability (LHWCA)

Code Details

33 USC 905: Exclusiveness of liability
Text contains those laws in effect on August 26, 2025
From Title 33-NAVIGATION AND NAVIGABLE WATERS
CHAPTER 18-LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

Exact Statute Text

33 U.S.C. § 905 Summary

This section of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) outlines the boundaries of an employer’s responsibility for injuries sustained by covered workers. Generally, it establishes that an employer’s obligation to provide LHWCA benefits is the sole remedy available to an injured employee or their family against that employer. This means that, for most workplace injuries, the worker cannot sue their direct employer for additional damages beyond the compensation provided by the LHWCA.

However, there are critical exceptions and nuances. If an employer fails to secure the required compensation insurance, an injured employee gains the option to either claim LHWCA benefits or pursue a lawsuit against the employer. In such a lawsuit, the employer is barred from using common defenses like the negligence of a fellow employee, assumption of risk, or the injured employee’s own contributory negligence.

The statute also addresses situations where a “vessel” (ship) is negligent, allowing an injured worker to sue the vessel as a third party. This third-party action has specific limitations, particularly when the injured person’s employer is also the vessel owner or operator, especially in stevedoring or shipbuilding services. Importantly, claims against vessels cannot be based on the “warranty of seaworthiness,” and the LHWCA still remains the exclusive remedy against the vessel, apart from the negligence action permitted. These provisions also extend to certain injuries on the Outer Continental Shelf.

Purpose of 33 U.S.C. § 905

The legislative intent behind this statute is to establish a foundational “grand bargain” within maritime worker compensation. It aims to strike a balance between providing assured, no-fault benefits to injured longshore and harbor workers and protecting their employers from potentially crippling common-law lawsuits. By making LHWCA compensation the “exclusive remedy,” the Act ensures that employers have a predictable financial liability for workplace injuries, fostering stability in the maritime industry.

This framework addresses the historical challenges of maritime injury litigation, where proving fault could be difficult and outcomes uncertain. It also clarifies the often complex interplay between an employer’s liability and the potential liability of third parties, such as vessel owners. The specific carve-outs for vessel negligence ensure that workers have avenues for greater recovery when third parties contribute to their injuries, while simultaneously preventing employers from being held indirectly liable for vessel negligence through indemnity agreements. Ultimately, this legal provision provides a structured and efficient system for compensating injured workers while defining the scope of responsibility for all involved parties.

Real-World Example of 33 U.S.C. § 905

Consider Maria, a longshore worker in the Port of Houston, employed by “Port Logistics, Inc.” Her job involves loading and unloading cargo from various ships.

Scenario 1: Exclusive Employer Liability
While working on the dock, Maria slips on a patch of oil that her employer’s crew had negligently left uncleaned. She sustains a back injury. Port Logistics, Inc. has LHWCA insurance. Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(a), Maria can file a claim for LHWCA benefits, which will cover her medical expenses and a portion of her lost wages. She cannot, however, sue Port Logistics, Inc. directly for additional damages like pain and suffering, because the LHWCA provides the exclusive remedy against her employer for this injury.

Scenario 2: Vessel Negligence
On another occasion, Maria is working aboard a vessel, the M/V *Ocean Voyager*, which is owned by “Global Shipping Co.” As she is guiding a container, a faulty crane on the *Ocean Voyager* — which is part of the vessel’s equipment and maintained by Global Shipping Co. — malfunctions, causing the container to swing wildly and strike Maria, severely injuring her leg. Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), Maria can still claim LHWCA benefits from her employer, Port Logistics, Inc., for her injury. Additionally, she can bring a separate lawsuit against Global Shipping Co. (the vessel owner) for their negligence in maintaining the crane. This third-party lawsuit would allow her to seek damages beyond what LHWCA provides, such as for pain, suffering, and full economic losses. Importantly, Port Logistics, Inc. (her employer) would not be liable to Global Shipping Co. for any damages resulting from this lawsuit.

Scenario 3: Employer Fails to Secure Compensation
Suppose Maria was employed by a small, uninsured contractor, “Harbor Crew Services,” which failed to secure LHWCA insurance as required. If Maria is injured on the job, under 33 U.S.C. § 905(a), she has a choice. She can elect to pursue compensation under the LHWCA through alternative means (like the special fund for uninsured employers), or she can directly sue Harbor Crew Services in court for damages. In such a lawsuit, Harbor Crew Services would be legally prohibited from arguing that Maria was partly at fault or that a fellow worker’s negligence caused her injury.

Related Statutes

Several other statutes are closely associated with 33 U.S.C. § 905, providing context and defining its scope:

• 33 U.S.C. § 904 – Liability for compensation: This section outlines the general requirement for employers to secure the payment of compensation for injuries sustained by longshore and harbor workers. Section 905 directly references § 904 by stating that the liability “prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive,” underscoring that the benefits mandated by § 904 are the primary form of recovery.
• 33 U.S.C. § 933 – Compensation for injuries where third persons are liable: This statute details the procedures and rights involved when a third party (other than the employer) is responsible for a worker’s injury. Section 905(b) specifically states that actions against a negligent vessel are brought “in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title,” thereby integrating the rules for third-party lawsuits into the LHWCA framework.
• 43 U.S.C. § 1333 – Laws applicable to Outer Continental Shelf: Known as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), this statute extends the coverage of the LHWCA to workers on the Outer Continental Shelf. Section 905(c) directly applies the vessel negligence provisions of subsection (b) to injuries sustained by persons covered by the LHWCA through the OCSLA, ensuring consistent treatment for these offshore workers.

Case Law Interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 905

The interpretation and application of this statute have been shaped by numerous court decisions, particularly concerning vessel negligence and the scope of the exclusive remedy.

• *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos*, 451 U.S. 156 (1981): This landmark Supreme Court case is pivotal for understanding vessel liability under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). It established the duties a vessel owner owes to longshoremen working on its ship, clarifying that the vessel is generally not liable for open and obvious hazards or for the stevedore’s operational negligence unless the vessel has actual knowledge of a hazard and fails to intervene, or actively participates in the stevedoring operations. This case significantly defined the boundaries of negligence claims against vessels.

• *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer*, 462 U.S. 523 (1983): While primarily addressing the calculation of damages in LHWCA third-party actions, this Supreme Court decision reinforced the two-track recovery system under the Act. It affirmed that a longshoreman injured by a third-party vessel’s negligence could seek damages from the vessel beyond LHWCA compensation, consistent with the framework established by § 905(b).

• *Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A.*, 512 U.S. 92 (1994): This Supreme Court ruling further refined the vessel owner’s duty to warn under § 905(b). It held that a vessel has a duty to warn stevedores of latent (hidden) dangers that the vessel knows about or should know about through the exercise of reasonable care, and that the stevedore is not in a position to discover. This helps define what constitutes “negligence of a vessel.”

Why 33 U.S.C. § 905 Matters in Personal Injury Litigation

This crucial section of the LHWCA profoundly impacts personal injury cases for maritime workers, shaping legal strategies and potential outcomes. For injured longshoremen and harbor workers in Texas, understanding its provisions is paramount to navigating their rights and seeking appropriate compensation.

For plaintiffs (injured workers), this statute clearly defines who they can and cannot sue. While it generally prohibits direct negligence lawsuits against their employer, it carves out a vital exception: the ability to sue a negligent “vessel” as a third party. This distinction is critical because LHWCA benefits, while providing essential medical care and wage replacement, do not typically cover non-economic damages like pain and suffering. A successful third-party claim against a negligent vessel owner, allowed under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), can lead to a more comprehensive recovery, including these additional damages. Therefore, thoroughly investigating the cause of an injury to identify any potential third-party vessel negligence is a cornerstone of effective plaintiff strategy.

For employers, the statute offers significant protection, providing an “exclusive remedy” that limits their liability to the LHWCA benefits. This predictability helps maritime businesses manage risk and insurance costs. However, it also underscores the critical importance for employers to secure proper LHWCA insurance, as failure to do so strips them of this exclusive remedy protection and exposes them to direct lawsuits with fewer available defenses.

For vessel owners and operators, § 905 defines their potential exposure to liability. It clarifies that they can be sued for their own negligence, but explicitly removes the outdated “warranty of seaworthiness” as a basis for such claims. This means vessel owners must focus on maintaining safe conditions and practices to avoid negligence, but they are not held to a standard of absolute liability for every unsafe condition on board.

Ultimately, 33 U.S.C. § 905 is a cornerstone of maritime personal injury law, dictating the avenues for recovery, the parties that can be held liable, and the scope of available damages. Both legal professionals and injured clients must grasp its intricacies to ensure just and equitable outcomes in the complex world of Texas maritime personal injury claims.