Agriculture Code § 143.102 – Livestock Running at Large on Highways Prohibited

Agriculture Code § 143.102 Summary

This Texas law, Agriculture Code Section 143.102, states that individuals who own or are responsible for controlling certain types of livestock are forbidden from intentionally allowing these animals to wander freely and unsupervised onto the right-of-way of a public highway. The specific animals covered by this statute include horses, mules, donkeys, cows, bulls, steers, hogs, sheep, and goats. The core of the prohibition lies in the “knowingly permit” clause, meaning the owner or responsible party must have awareness or intent in allowing the animal to be at large on the highway.

Purpose of Agriculture Code § 143.102 Purpose

The legislative intent behind Agriculture Code § 143.102 is primarily focused on public safety and preventing dangerous traffic accidents. By prohibiting livestock owners from knowingly allowing their animals to roam unattended on highways, the statute aims to minimize the risk of collisions between vehicles and large animals. Such collisions can result in severe personal injuries, fatalities, and significant property damage. This law establishes a clear standard of care for livestock owners, reinforcing their responsibility to contain their animals, especially when properties border public roadways. It acknowledges the inherent danger that a wandering horse, cow, or other specified animal poses to motorists traveling at high speeds, thus serving to protect the traveling public from entirely avoidable hazards on Texas roads.

Real-World Example of Agriculture Code § 143.102 Real-World Example

Imagine a rancher, Mr. Smith, who owns several cows in rural Texas. One evening, after a gate latch broke, Mr. Smith noticed that his prize bull, “Buster,” had wandered out of the pasture. Instead of immediately attempting to retrieve Buster, Mr. Smith decided to wait until morning, thinking Buster would eventually return. During the night, Buster wandered onto the right-of-way of a nearby state highway, which was dark and unlit. Ms. Garcia, driving home late, did not see Buster until it was too late and collided with the animal. The collision caused extensive damage to Ms. Garcia’s car and resulted in severe personal injuries, requiring hospitalization. In this scenario, Mr. Smith could be found in violation of Agriculture Code § 143.102 because he “knowingly permitted” Buster to be at large, unattended, on the highway’s right-of-way by his decision to delay retrieval despite knowing the animal was loose. This knowing allowance of the animal on the highway could then be a key factor in establishing his liability for Ms. Garcia’s damages and injuries.

Related Statutes

Agriculture Code § 143.102 does not exist in a vacuum; it relates to other Texas laws concerning animal control and owner responsibility.

• Agriculture Code § 143.101 – Local Stock Law Elections: This preceding section in the same chapter deals with the ability of Texas counties or defined areas to adopt local “stock laws” through elections. These laws determine whether particular types of livestock are permitted to run at large within those specific local areas. While § 143.102 prohibits livestock on *highways* statewide regardless of local stock laws, § 143.101 provides the broader context for range restrictions and the general allowance or prohibition of animals running at large in other areas.
• Common Law Negligence: Beyond the specific statutory violation, the principles of common law negligence often apply in cases involving animals. Even if a specific stock law isn’t violated, an animal owner can still be found negligent if they failed to exercise reasonable care in controlling their animal, and that failure caused injury. Agriculture Code § 143.102 essentially provides a statutory basis for negligence when its specific conditions are met.

Case Law Interpreting Agriculture Code § 143.102 Case Law

Texas courts have interpreted the “knowingly permit” standard in Agriculture Code § 143.102 (and its predecessors) and similar stock laws. A pivotal case in understanding this standard is *Gibbs v. Jackson*.

• In Gibbs v. Jackson, 990 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1999) [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Gibbs+v.+Jackson+990+S.W.2d+745], the Texas Supreme Court extensively discussed the “knowingly permit” requirement in the context of a stock law. The Court clarified that “knowingly permit” means that the owner or custodian of the animal must be aware that the animal is at large, or that the owner’s conduct is “such as to show a reckless disregard of whether the animals remained in the enclosure.” This implies more than mere negligence; it requires some level of actual or constructive knowledge that the animal is loose or is likely to get loose. Simply owning an animal that escapes is not enough; there must be evidence that the owner knew, or should have known due to their reckless actions, that the animal was or would be at large on the prohibited area. Subsequent cases, such as *Wedgeworth v. Fitzhugh, 668 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)* [https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Wedgeworth+v.+Fitzhugh+668+S.W.2d+833], have affirmed similar interpretations, emphasizing that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the owner’s knowledge or reckless disregard regarding the animal being at large.

Why Agriculture Code § 143.102 Matters in Personal Injury Litigation

Agriculture Code § 143.102 plays a critical role in personal injury litigation, particularly for cases involving vehicle-animal collisions in Texas. For plaintiffs, establishing a violation of this statute can significantly strengthen their claim for damages. When an owner “knowingly permits” livestock to roam at large on a highway’s right-of-way, this can be considered negligence *per se*. Negligence *per se* means that the defendant’s act is considered inherently negligent because it violates a statute designed to protect the public from the very type of harm that occurred. This simplifies the plaintiff’s burden of proof by effectively establishing a breach of duty and causation, shifting the focus to damages.

For personal injury attorneys representing victims, proving the “knowingly permit” element is crucial. This often involves investigating the owner’s actions (or inactions) leading up to the incident, their awareness of fencing conditions, prior escapes, or any deliberate delays in retrieving a known-to-be-loose animal. Conversely, defense attorneys representing livestock owners will focus on disproving the “knowingly permit” aspect, arguing that the escape was unforeseen, the owner took reasonable precautions, or they were unaware of the animal’s presence on the highway. The statute sets a clear standard of care, making it a powerful tool for both sides in negotiating settlements and arguing cases in court, directly impacting the potential for recovery for victims of these often-devastating accidents.